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Title of Dissertation:      Analysis and Countermeasures on Ship Failures 
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In recent years, ship failures during navigation have frequently occurred in the Chang 
Jiang Kou (CJK) Fairway of Shanghai port, and showing an increasing trend, which 
has brought huge challenges to the local environment and navigation safety of ships. 
This dissertation takes ship failures in the CJK Fairway as the research object, makes 
analysis (to the factors leading to the failures) and points out that the unique 
hydrological characteristics and the complex navigation environment of the CJK 
Fairway are the external causes of frequent ship failures, and poor ship management 
and human factors are the internal causes of frequent ship failures. Based on the ship 
failures data accumulated by the local maritime authorities in the past five years, the 
author sorts out the pattern for the ship failures. By using the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
method, a Fault Tree with ship failures during navigation in the CJK Fairway as the 
top event is established, and qualitative and quantitative analysis are carried out. Based 
on the results of the analysis, the author puts forward to relevant stakeholders the 
feasible measures for reducing the ship failures in the CJK Fairway. At the same time, 
future challenges are also discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Shipping, as an important carrier of international transportation, has made 
extraordinary contributions to the development of world interconnection, globalization 
and global economy by transporting more than 80 per cent of global trade to peoples 
and communities all over the world (IMO, 2020). However, according to IMO (2002), 
“While shipping is one of the most international industry of all the world, it is also 
perhaps one of the most dangerous.” In the process of ship’s operation, it is necessary 
not only to resist external risks such as severe weather, complicated navigation 
environment, piracy, etc., but also to prevent internal risks such as ship equipment 
failures, poor maintenance, structure of the ship, special features of the goods, and 
human errors, etc. To this end, maritime stakeholders such as Member States, IMO, 
classification societies have performed their duties and worked together to formulate 
a large number of maritime regulations in the field of enhancing the safety of ships 
and public safety, such as SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW, MLC, ISM Code and Rules of 
RO (Recognized Organization). 
However, these regulations have not been able to prevent ship failures or accidents 
completely. What we can do is to find out the factors that affect the safe operation of 
ships by analyzing the risks as comprehensively as possible, and devote our limited 
energy to those special factors so as to minimize safety threat to the ship.  
Ship failures during navigation refer to such a state of the ship: when the ship is 
navigating at sea as scheduled, a sudden failure of the machinery or equipment on 
board the ship may occur which cannot be repaired immediately, making the ship 
unable to sail according to the officer's wishes, and the ship's maneuvering is restricted 
or the ship is completely out of control. Cases have shown that in the densely nearshore 
channel, limited operations or loss of control due to ship failures will give rise to an 
urgent situation for surrounding ships, and may lead to block of the channel, collisions, 
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oil spills, sinking of ships, or even serious casualties. 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is one of the important methods often used in safety system 
engineering. It is mainly used to identify and evaluate system hazards. It can not only 
analyze the direct causes of accidents, but also reveal the potential causes of accidents 
in depth (Lin & Zhang, 2007). FTA is a widely used technique to estimate the safety 
and reliability of safety-critical systems (Qiao, Liu, Ma & Liu, 2020), such as ship 
grounding accident cause analysis (Kum & Sahin, 2015), explosions in oil tankers 
(Wang, Zhang & Chen, 2013) and LNG carrier accident analysis (Zhou, Wu, Zhang 
& Zhang, 2017). Zhou, Wang and Ding (2002) established a fault tree about ship 
engine room fires, gave the structural importance ranking of each basic event through 
analysis, and proposed preventive measures. Yao, Ren and Li (2010) took ship 
collision accidents as an example, and established a fault tree based on the various 
factors affecting collision accidents. After making analysis, they obtained the 
importance coefficient of each factor and put forward measures for controlling ship 
collision accidents.  
Fault tree analyses were used in the above-mentioned literature, and the influencing 
factors of each research object can be identified more clearly, which has a positive 
effect on improving management methods. 
1.2 Target and objectives of the research  
The target of the research is ship failures during navigation in Shanghai Chang Jiang 
Kou (CJK) Fairway, which include North Deep-water Fairway, Extend Fairway of the 
deep-water route and South Fairway. These areas are under the coverage of Wusong 
Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) center, and are under administration of Wusong Maritime 
Safety Administration (MSA) which is one of the branches of Shanghai Maritime 
Safety Administration (Shanghai MSA).  
Statistics show that in recent years, ships in Shanghai’s CJK Fairway have experienced 
frequent failures and the situation is becoming worse. Ship groundings, collisions and 
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even oil spills are often related to ship failures, posing a major threat to the good order 
and safety of navigation, ship safety, crew life and the local marine environment.  
This paper analyzes a large number of ship failure data accumulated from 2015 to 2019 
on the Shanghai CJK Fairway, classifies the causes for ship failures, identifies 
common factors that affect ship failures, and builds a fault tree based on the analyses. 
Through qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, the importance of each basic 
event affecting ship's failures is calculated. Based on the calculation results, it provides 
reasonable suggestions on reducing ship failure rate to stakeholders such as ships, ship 
management companies and competent maritime authorities. 
1.3 Methodology 
In order to achieve the objectives of the research, this paper uses a variety of research 
methods, such as data summary, case analysis, questionnaires and the FTA method. 
Firstly, a statistical analysis of 895 ship failures that occurred in the Shanghai CJK 
Fairway from 2015 to 2019 carried out, and the elements analyzed include the time 
and location of the failures, type of the ships, the cause of the failures. In this way, the 
common pattern leading to the failures is summarized. 
Secondly, typical cases are selected for making deep analysis to the causes of ship 
failures. 
Thirdly, as the key research method of this paper, based on the results of data analysis, 
different ship system failures that caused ship failures are regarded as intermediate 
events, and the specific causes of system failures are regarded as the basic events. The 
paper establishes a formal fault tree based on the logical relationship between basic 
events and intermediate events, conducts a qualitative analysis based on the FAT 
method, and then carries out a quantitative analysis based on the average value 
assigned by ship management experts to the probability of each basic event. 
Based on the conclusions drawn from the above research methods, suggestions for 
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reducing ship failures will be put forward. 
1.4 Structure of the dissertation   
This dissertation consists of 6 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background, target, 
objectives and methodologies the research will use. Chapter 2 introduces the 
hydrologic and navigation characteristics of the CJK Fairway, and introduces the total 
numbers, types and characteristics of ship failures in the CJK Fairway in the past five 
years. The hazards of ship failures are also discussed, and two typical cases are 
analyzed. Chapter 3 provides patterns for ship failures in CJK Fairway. Chapter 4 
provides the FAT theory, and ship failures in CJK Fairway are analyzed in detail using 
the FAT method. Chapter 5 provides relevant recommendations based on the FAT 
analysis, and challenges are also discussed. Chapter 6 is the conclusion of the 
dissertation.  
 
CHAPTER 2 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CJK FAIRWAY AND HAZ-
ARDS OF SHIP FAILURES 
2.1 Hydrological characteristics of the CJK Fairway areas  
The CJK Fairway areas are located at the entrance of the Yangtze River into the East 
China Sea. Due to the large amount of sand in the Yangtze River water body (Bao, 
Peng, Bao & Lou, 2020), under the years of alluvial accumulation, the sedimentation 
of the Yangtze River Estuary waters is obvious (See figure 1). The natural water depth 
is only 5-7 meters, and some shallow points are even less than 3 meters. With the 
development of larger-sized vessels, the natural water depth cannot meet the draft 
needs of large ships. Therefore, the Chinese government has invested a huge amount 
of money since the 1990s, and gradually dredged a Deep-water route with a width of 
350-400 meters and a water depth of 12.5 meters, and South Fairway with a water 
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depth of 7 meters.  
Figure 1 - Satellite picture of the Yangtze River Estuary 
Source: Google map 
The estuary area is a complex environmental system that is affected by the combined 
action of river basin runoff and ocean tides. The tidal waves in the estuary have 
completely different characteristics from the regular tide waves in the ocean. The tidal 
spectrum of the estuary develops to a more complex shallow-water tidal spectrum, and 
the tidal wave energy is redistributed, making the tides show significant nonlinear 
deformation and asymmetry. The estuary of the Yangtze River is a tidal estuary of 
moderate intensity with irregular half-diurnal tides (Cao &Ji, 2018). The maximum 
and average tidal range can reach 4.62m and 2.67m respectively (Lu, Wu & Tong, 
2019).  
In winter, the Yangtze River estuary is often hit by cold waves, which bring strong 
winds and waves. In summer and autumn, typhoons in the Western Pacific often affect 
the region. Strong winds with wind force greater than 6 prevail for an average of 63 
days per year, and strong winds with wind force greater than 7 last for an average of 
42 days per year. In addition, in winter and spring, foggy weather often occurs, with 
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an average annual foggy day of 28.8 days (Dong, 2015).   
Unlike in other coastal ports in China, the unique hydrologic characteristics  of the 
estuary make it more difficult for ships to navigate in the CJK Fairway, because the 
main engine rotation speed and rudder angle of the ship should keep changing to 
maintain the course of the ship. Fog and high winds also pose challenges to the officers 
on board the ships.  
2.2 Navigation characteristics of the CJK Fairway 
Figure 2 - Schematic diagram of the CJK Fairway 
Note: A: CJK A precautionary area                 B: CJK B precautionary area 
          C: Yuan Yuan Sha precautionary area   D: Wu Song Kou precautionary area 
Source: China MSA  
Figure 2 above is a schematic diagram of the CJK Fairway. The CJK Fairway includes 
the CJK Deep-water Fairway (54 nautical miles) and South Fairway (45 nautical 
miles). The CJK Deep Water Fairway is divided into two parts: North Deep-water 











The Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) is implemented in CJK Fairway, and Wusong 
VTS center which is one of a department of Wusong MSA， provides traffic 
organization service, information service and navigation aids service for the water 
areas.  
The provinces near the mouth of the Yangtze River are the most economically 
developed regions in China, with huge international trade volume, and the mouth of 
the Yangtze River is the only way for ships to enter the hinterland of China, as a result, 
the flow of ships is very dense in the CJK Fairway. It can be seen from Table 1 that in 
the past three years, there were 170-190,000 navigable vessels in the CJK Fairway 
annually, and the total number of navigable vessels is on the rise. Figure 3 is a real-
time navigation dynamic map generated based on the ship's Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) signal, and each triangle represents a ship. It can be intuitively felt from 
the picture that traffic in the CJK Fairway is very dense.  
Table 1 - The total number of navigable vessels in the CJK Fairway in the past three 
years 
 North Fairway South Fairway Total 
2017 69,799 105,394 175,193 
2018 63,043 110,901 173,944 
2019 64,644 124,857 189,501 
Source: Wusong VTS 
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Figure 3 - Real-time navigation dynamic map of the CJK Fairway 
Source: http://www.shipxy.com/ 
Since the deep-water route is an artificial dredging channel and the width of the 
channel is limited, deep draft ships must strictly follow the channel direction when 
navigating in the deep-water channel. Leaving the channel will cause the ship to 
ground. 
In addition, there are many meeting points for ships in the CJK Fairway. For example, 
in the Yuan Yuan Sha precaution zone in Figure 2, large ships in the North Fairway 
will meet with ships in the South Fairway; in the Wu Song Kou precaution zone, ships 
sailing on the Yangtze River will meet Ships going in and out of the Huangpu River or 
ships in and out of the Wusongkou anchorage. Since small vessels like to sail by tide 
to save fuel, the density of ships in a day is not evenly distributed. During the 
transitional period from low tide to high tide, the Wu Song Kou precaution zone will 
be very dense with ships, making it the most complicated navigation environment in 
the CJK fairway.  
The unique hydrological and navigable characteristics make the waters of the CJK 
Fairway one of the busiest channels in the world. When a ship sails here, the seafarers 
need to keep focus at all times and keep a safe distance from the surrounding ships, 
and the engineers should ensure that the power equipment in the engine room are 




2.3 The number of ship failures during navigation in the CJK Fairway in recent 
years 
According to Regulation 15 of the “Measures for the Administration of Navigation 
Safety of the CJK Deep-water fairway” issued by Shanghai MSA, “If an accident or 
dangerous situation occurs or is discovered on a ship, there is or is suspected of having 
hull, power equipment, control equipment and other abnormal conditions that affect 
navigation safety, the ship should notify surrounding ships in time and report to 
Wusong VTS Center at the same time.” (Shanghai MSA, 2018).  
The author made a statistic on the ship failure data received or discovered by Wusong 
VTS center in the CJK Fairway during the past five years from 2015 to 2019. As shown 
in Figure 4, a total of 895 ship failures occurred during the five years from 2015 to 
2019. There were 99 ships failures during navigation in the CJK Fairway in 2015, but 
in the following four years, the number of ship failures increased year by year. In 2017, 
the number of ship failures increased significantly with an increase of 87% compared 
with the figure in 2016. In 2019, a historical record was set for 259 ship failures in the 
fairway, and an average of 5 ship failures occurred every week, which was 2.6 times 











2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
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Figure 4 - Number of ship failures in the CJK Fairway from 2015 – 2019 
Source: Author 
According to statistics from Wusong MSA, nearly 50% of the ship accidents in the 
jurisdiction are related to the loss of control caused by the ship's failure. It can be said 
that the situation is very serious whether from the perspective of the accidents that may 
be caused by ship failures or from the increasing trend of the number of ship failures. 
Therefore, conducting research on ship failures, discovering the patterns and root 
causes, and making suggestions to reduce ship failures is of great significance to 
maintaining the safety and stability of the CJK Fairway.  
2.4 Hazards of ship failure in the CJK Fairway 
In view of the special hydrological and navigable characteristics of the CJK Fairway 
water areas, the failure of ships in CJK Fairway during navigation is very harmful. 
Ship failures can make the ship slow down or face restriction in operation, and even 
make the ship lose control and lead to secondary accidents. In the following parts, the 
paper analyzes the hazards of ship failures from the perspective of the impact on ships, 
crews, management companies, the environment and the navigation environment.  
2.4.1 Hazards to ships 
The failure of the ship firstly will make the ship unable to sail normally, the operation 
was restricted or completely out of control, and the tugs will be required to tow the 
ship to the nearest anchorage for repair. If the fault is caused by damage of machines, 
spare parts often need to be imported from abroad if the ship has no spare parts on 
board, and the ship has to wait in the anchorage for many days, which will cause the 
delay of voyage. If the ship collides with another ship or runs ground, the structure of 
the ship may be damaged and needs to be repaired at the shipyard, which will also 
cause delays in the shipping schedule. In the most severe case, a ship collision will 
cause the ship to sink. 
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In addition, the Shanghai MSA will send Port State Control Officers (PSCOs) to go on 
board the ship for inspection if the ship failure at the entrance channel of the CJK 
Fairway. Compared with the inspection of ships in normal operation, PSCOs will 
inspect the failure ships in more details. If serious deficiencies are found, the ships will 
be detained immediately until the relevant deficiencies are rectified.  This can be 
seen as a punitive measure taken by local maritime authorities for promoting the level 
of ship management. 
2.4.2 Hazards to crew 
The crew will feel nervous and stressful when a ship breaks down in the CJK Fairway, 
and carries this emotion in repairing the fault. Under high stress conditions, the 
judgment and execution capacity of the crew will be greatly reduced, and human error 
is more likely to occur which will lead to secondary accidents. 
In addition, collisions caused by ship failures will directly threaten the safety of crew 
members. 
2.4.3 Hazards to ship management companies 
For ship management companies, voyage delays and ship repairs caused by ship 
failures will increase ship operating costs and reduce operating revenue. If the vessel 
frequent failure caused frequent delays, it will reduce the company's reputation, and 
resulting in reduced cargo supply. If the ship is detained during the Port State Control 
(PSC) inspection after the failure, it will also lead to the degradation of the company's 
performance, which may result in the shortening of the PSC inspection window for the 
ships managed by the entire company.  
In addition, if collisions and oil spills occur after a ship failure, the company will also 
face a huge claim from parties concerned. 
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2.4.4 Hazards to the environment 
The collision caused by the ship's failure may cause oil spills and seriously damage 
the ecological environment of the Yangtze River Estuary. The Yangtze River is the 
main source of drinking water in Shanghai, and if there is a large-scale oil spill, the 
safety of drinking water for Shanghai residents will be seriously threatened. 
2.4.5 Hazards to navigation environment 
The CJK Fairway is an artificial dredging channel. Ships with a draft of more than 7 
meters can only navigate safely in the deep-water route. If large vessels break down in 
the deep-water channel and cannot be repaired in a short time, the "golden waterway" 
of the Yangtze River will be blocked directly, making it impossible for other large 
vessels to enter or leave normally. 
2.5 Analysis of typical ship failure cases 
Case 1: 
At 15:20 on July 28, 2017, when an oil tanker called “YU SHUN 217” navigated in 
the entrance channel of Extend Fairway of Deep-water route, the connection ring of 
the hydraulic oil pump of the steering gear suddenly broke. As a result, the steering 
gear lost hydraulic power, and the rudder angle was stuck at amidships and cannot be 
changed. 
The failure of the steering gear made “YU SHUN 217” unable to change her course in 
the busy CJK Fairway, so the captain immediately slowed down the main engine to 
reduce the speed of the ship. But as the speed decreased, the ship's course became 
unstable under the influence of the water flow and begins to turn sharply to the port 
side. The helpless captain could only watch “YU SHUN 217” to collide with the bulk 
carrier “XIN HAIFU” which was navigating in the same direction on the port side at 
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buoy D51 ten minutes after the steering gear failure happened.   
The gross tonnage of “XIN HAIFU” is 8236, while the gross tonnage of “YU SHUN 
217” is 499. Due to the large tonnage difference, “XIN HAIFU” was not significantly 
damaged after the collision, but there were multiple cracks in the port side of “YU 
SHUN 217”, and the bulkhead of its No. 2 cargo hold was cracked.  
After the collision, water flooded into “YU SHUN 217” and the ship listed to portside. 
In order to maintain the stability of the ship and prevent the ship from overturning, the 
captain of “YU SHUN 217” directly pumped out nearly 88 tons of fuel oil loaded in 
the port No. 2 and No. 3 holds into the Yangtze River, which resulted in a severe 
pollution to nearby waters (see Figure 5).  
Figure 5 – Failure of “YU SHUN 217” caused a severe oil pollution 
Source: Author 
Case 2: 
At 20:35 on April 28, 2018, when a ship called “HUA JIANG 10” navigated near buoy 
D41 of North fairway entrance channel, the main engine suddenly stopped and the 
engineer could not find the cause, which rendered the ship out of control. The diesel 
engine of generator was also stopped 15 minims later, and the ship was blacked out. 
Although the master wanted to use the remaining speed to guide the ship to safe waters, 
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but the speed of the ship dropped quickly after power off, and the ship immediately 
lost control completely.  
In order to control the ship from colliding with nearby ships, the master dropped an 
anchor regardless of the fact that the ship was in the no-anchor zone with 
communication cables buried under the water. However, due to the excessive inertia 
of the ship, the connection between the anchor chain and the hull broke, and the ship 
did not stop as the master planned. Subsequently, the ship was pushed to a shallow 
point by the current and grounded, which led to the list of the ship. 
Fortunately, the anchor did not cause any damage to the underwater cables. The ship 
was pulled out with the assistance of the tug at nest high tide, and there was no oil 
spill.  
When the maritime investigation officer boarded the ship to investigate the cause of 
the failure, it was discovered that the ship’s loss of control was caused by human error. 
The chief engineer of the ship had just shifted on board at the previous port and was 
working on that ship for the first time. When the chief engineer toured the engine room 
before the incident, he found that the carbon dioxide release control box for the oil 
purifier room was not properly closed, so he opened the box and closed it again. 
However, for fire safety considerations, there is an interlock device in the control box 
(see Figure 6). When the release box opened, the power of fuel supply pump and the 
fan of the engine room will automatically be cut off, but the chief engineer had no idea 
about it. The main engine stopped in no time due to the lack of the fuel.  
After the main engine stopped, the chief engineer found that the fuel pump switch in 
the engine control room was disconnected, but the switch couldn’t be switched on. 
Because as the design of the fuel supply system of the ship, the system should be reset 
at the fuel oil supply unit firstly after being switched off, but the engineers of the ship 
did not know that, so the fuel pump could not be started again. Fifteen minutes later, 
the diesel engine of generator ran out the fuel in the pipeline and stopped working led 
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to black out. The fault was not removed until the ship ultimately grounded.  
Figure 6 - Interlock device in CO2 release control box 
Source: Author 
 
CHAPTER 3 REGULARITIES OF SHIP FAILURES IN THE CJK FAIRWAY 
3.1 Types and characteristics of ship failures in the CJK Fairway during 2018 and 
2019  
The author analyzed all 506 ship failure records collected by Wusong VTS in 2018 
and 2019 one by one, and classified them according to the causes of ship failures. All 
the cases are divided into main engine failure, steering gear failure, cooling water 
system failure, black out and generator engine failure, etc. The main engine failures 
are subdivided into the main engine component failure, main engine fuel system 
failure, main engine cooling system failure, main engine electronic system failure, 
main engine control system failure and main engine lubricating oil system failure. The 
analysis of the data lays the foundation for the research in the following parts.  
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3.1.1 Analysis to main engine failures  
Judging from the causes of failures reported to Wusong VTS by ships, main engine 
failures have been the main cause of ship failures over the years. In 2018, a total of 
186 ship main engine failures occurred in the CJK Fairway, accounting for 80% of all 
failures that year; in 2019, 194 ship main engine failures occurred in the CJK Fairway 
accounting for 75% of failures for the year. 
Due to the similar causes of main engine failures in each year, only the main engine 
failure events in 2019 are analyzed in detail here. 
Table 2 - Analysis of the main engine failure of the CJK Fairway in 2019 




Main engine  
component failure 
78 41.2% 
Failure of governor, supercharger, 
exhaust valve, cylinder head start 
valve, piston ring, cylinder liner, 
bearing and other wear and 
pressure parts 
Main engine fuel 
system failure 
62 31.9% 
High-pressure oil pipe rupture, 
high-pressure oil pump failure, 
fuel injection nozzle clogged, oil 
pump suction filter blocked 
Main engine cooling 
system failure 
29 14.9% 
Sea water suction filter blocked、
cooling pipe rupture 
Main engine  
electronic system 
failure 
11 5.7% Short out of circuit board 
Main engine control 
system failure 
8 4.1% 
Air control system failure、
Control element failure 
Main engine  
lubricating oil  
system failure 
6 3.1% 
Low lubricating oil pressure due 
to filter blocks 
Source: Autor 
Table 2 above shows the common categories of main engine failures, and the following 
is a detailed analysis to the causes of main engine failures: 
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 1) Main engine component failures 
It is the largest number of failures by this type all of failure throughout the year 
which accounts for 41.2% of total failures. According to the data statistics, the failure 
probability of the pressure-bearing and wear-prone parts in the main body parts is 
higher. For example, stuck of the cylinder exhaust valve, worn of the turbocharger 
bearing and the breakdown of turbocharger screws, turbines and other small 
components take up a large number of all faults.  
On the one hand, the working environment of such parts is poor and it is indeed 
prone to wear and tear. At the same time, the frequent occurrence of such failures also 
reflects that the daily maintenance and inspection of the main engine of the ship is not 
in place, and the company's maintenance of the fleet is insufficient, or Safety 
Management System (SMS) operation relate to main engine maintenance is not in a 
good order. For example, as for cylinder liner wearing, after on-site inspection by the 
MSA officer, it was found that most of the engineers did not pre-pressure the 
lubricating oil according to the requirements of the SMS documents before starting, 
which leading to the occurrence of cylinder wearing.  
2) Main engine fuel system failures 
The fuel system failure accounts for a high proportion and has distinct 
characteristics. From the data analysis in 2019, the main engine high-pressure fuel pipe 
rupture, high-pressure fuel pump failure, and high-pressure fuel nozzle blockage have 
become the three most common faults in the fuel system. From the high-pressure fuel 
pump to the fuel pipe and the fuel nozzle, it is the last step before the ship's fuel enters 
the cylinder, and it is also the part with the greatest pressure in the entire fuel system. 
The root cause of the failure is that the components are damaged by long-term high 
pressure.  
This type of failure is one of the common types of failures of ships and has 
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attracted the attention of the industry. According to SOLAS (2014) Chapter II-2 
Regulation 4.2, “External high-pressure fuel delivery lines between the high-pressure 
fuel pumps and fuel injectors shall be protected with a jacketed piping system capable 
of containing fuel from a high-pressure line failure.”, and “The jacketed piping system 
shall include a means for collection of leakages and arrangements and shall be 
provided with an alarm in case of a fuel line failure.” Ships should pay great attention 
to this, and maritime departments should also carry out related inspection.  
In addition, in the case of fuel system failures, the blockage of filters is also very 
common, which indicates that the maintenance of the fuel filter by engineers is not 
good enough.  
3) Main engine cooling system failures 
In 2019, a total of 29 ships met with main engine cooling system failures when 
navigating in the CJK Fairway, which led to slow down of the engine. The main failure 
types can be divided into two categories, one is the clogging of the seawater inlet filter, 
and the other is the rupture of the cooling water pipe. According to the investigation, 
the filter or water pipe were mostly blocked by small fish groups, leading to the failure 
of cooling water supply. Such faults have their own seasonal pattern and often occur 
more frequently in fish season every year. The main causes of water pipe rupture were 
aging and corrosion of water pipe and lack of daily inspection and maintenance of 
cooling water pipe. 
4) Failures in main engine electronic system, control system and lubricating 
system 
The number of failures involving the main engine electronic system, control 
system and lubricating oil systems throughout the year was not high, accounting for 
about 14%. The overall performance is that the control unit circuit board is short-
circuited, the control system components are aging, and the oil pump is faulty resulting 
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in low pressure. Sometimes, a certain ship failure will cause the failure of other 
systems, such as the failure of the ship's lubricating oil system will often causes the 
main engine cylinders abnormal wear and damage the cylinder liner. 
It should be noted that the causes of such failures on some ships were related to 
the rude operations of ships. For example, in order to overcome the rapid fluctuation 
of tide in the deep-water channel or overtake the forward ship, the ship suddenly 
increased the load, leading to the failure of the main engine due to too high load. Before 
ships entering the CJK Fairway, or during deep-water navigation, they need to make 
full estimation and preparation for the characteristics of the waters.  
3.1.2 Analysis of all failure types 
The author classified the causes of all ship failures in 2018 and 2019. The failure of 
the main engine was the main cause, and there were other types of failures, as shown 
in Figures 7 and 8: 














Figure 8 – Failure types in 2019 
Source: Author 
According to statistics, a total of 247 ship failures occurred in the CJK Fairway in 
2018, of which 186 main engine failures accounted for 80% of the total annual failures, 
followed by steering gear failures (16 times), accounting for 7% of the total, and the 
third type of top failure is generator engine failures (15 times), accounting for 6%. 
From the data point of view, main engine failures have the largest volume, which is 
the most prominent problem of ship failures in CJK Fairway. 
There were a total of 259 ship failures in 2019, including 194 main engine failures, 
accounting for 75% of the total number of annual failures, followed by 30 steering 
gear failures, accounting for 11.6%, and 11 cooling water system failures, accounting 
for 4.2%, in the third category. The main engine failure and steering gear engine failure 
were still the main causes of ship failures. 
However, it is worth noting that although the number of steering gear engine faults 
were far less than that of the main engine, its influence to the ship was more obvious. 
Most of CJK Fairway is narrow waterway, which requires very high stability of ship’s 
heading. The loss of rudder effect of a ship will lead to grounding, collision and other 
traffic accidents in a short time. Compared with ship losing power, the danger of 
steering gear failure is more urgent, which deserves more attention.  















lost power and out of control if the ship’s emergency generator couldn’t start up and 
supply power in 45s by the requirement of SOLAS Chapter II-2 Regulation 43- 
“Emergency source of electrical power in cargo ships”, and secondary accidents like 
collision may happen. 
In addition, failures of ship's navigation aids were mainly manifested as failures of 
ship's AIS, radar and compass, and more than half of the failures were caused by AIS. 
3.2 Ship types 
Figure 9 – Ship types of failure ships in 2018 
Source: Author 
 
Figure 10 – Ship types of failure ships in 2019 
Source: Author 



























found that the proportion of each type of failed ships has not changed much. The main 
types of ships that have failed are bulk carriers, oil tankers, container ships and multi-
purpose ships. 
The number of bulk carrier failures exceeded 50% in these two years. It is understood 
that bulk carriers are the ships with higher profits in the shipping market at present, 
and the total number of ships entering and leaving the channel is relatively high. 
Meanwhile, the failure rate of these ships is also relatively high among all types of 
ships.  
3.3 Regions where failures happened 
According to the statistics of the water areas where the failures occur, the ship failure 
distribution shows a trend of the outside water areas happened more than internal water 
areas, and the North fairway and South fairway are the main regions where the ship 
failure occurs (see Figure 11). 
Figure 11 – Failures that took place by regions in 2018 and 2019 
Source: Author 
On the one hand, the North fairway and South fairway are relatively long and can 

















characteristics of the channel, the current in the channel is faster, so the ships need to 
change the rudder angle or speed of the main engine frequently and the output power 
fluctuates greatly, which will easily lead to the increase of the failure rate of the ship's 
main engine, steering engine, generator and other equipment.  
3.4 Month when failures happened  
Figure 12 – Month when failures happened during 2018 and 2019 
Source: Author 
According to the statistics shown in Figure 12, ship failures have obvious seasonal 
characteristics, mainly in winter and summer. Relatively speaking, high temperatures 
in summer are more likely to cause various types of ship failures. On the one hand, 
marine electromechanical equipment work in high temperature in summer, which 
requires higher cooling capacity and heavier equipment load. On the other hand, the 
high temperature of engine room in hot season makes the working environment of 
engineers more severe and easy to fatigue. Therefore, the maintenance and repair of 
equipment may not be in place, which may easily cause equipment failure. 
In addition, due to the continuous efforts of the Chinese government in environmental 
protection, the water quality of the Yangtze River and the ecological environment of 










Yangtze River estuary increase significantly, increasing the risk of blocking the filters 
due to the large number of small fish that are inhaled by the seawater cooling system 
when the ship passed the fish school. Once the filter is blocked, the cooling capacity 
will be insufficient, leading to the failure of the main engine or the auxiliary engine. 
Such cases have increased obviously in recent years.  
3.5 Human factor analysis for ship failures 
Although the most direct cause of ship failures is malfunction of the main engine, 
steering gear and other equipment, if we analyze the causes of these equipment failures 
in depth, we can find that human factors play an important role in the process of 
equipment failures. 
According to Andrea (2019), the human error is an inappropriate or unacceptable 
human decision or action that degrades efficiency, safety or system performance. By 
Catherine (2006), the human element is the most unpredictable factor, given that 
everyone has different behavior and understanding with the safety management not 
only in emergency situations but also during daily routine. 
Graziano (2016) said that most accidents involve the interaction between humans, 
organizations and systems. Report from Allianz (2017) even stated that it is estimated 
that 75% to 96% of marine accidents can be attributed to human error. 
Human errors can be caused by failure to maintain the equipment as required by SMS, 
mis-operation, fatigue, stress, communication barrier, etc. Due to the development of 
new technology on ship, the reliability of equipment is getting higher and higher, and 
the functions are becoming more and more comprehensive, but this has led to the 
excessive dependence of the crew on the equipment. As a result, the crews are at a loss 
in the event of equipment failure, and the emergency response capability is 
insufficient.  
On the other hand, while the ships become bigger and bigger, the manning become 
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less and less, and with more and more maritime conventions coming into force, crews 
on board ships undertake much more jobs than before. The rest time of seafarers are 
squeezed, therefore, they feel more stressful and easier to fatigue. Sanpson (2017) 
states that the feeling of ‘severe’ fatigue of seafarers has been increased from 24% in 
2011 to 36% in 2016. 
According to the study by Professor Baumler from WMU, people’s performance will 
vary with different workload as shown in Figure 13. When the workload is too low, 
people's attention is difficult to concentrate, performance is at a low level, and the 
system is in an unsafe state. As the workload increases, people's performance will 
gradually improve until it reaches a peak, the probability of human error will gradually 
decrease, and the system is in a safe state. But when the workload is too heavy, people's 
performance will decrease rapidly after the peak, human errors will increase 
significantly, and the system will be in an unsafe state or out of control. 
Figure 13 – Relationship between work performance and workload 
Source: Professor Baumler from WMU 
This is because the cognitive resources of people are limited, and demanding and 
complex tasks require large resources (Baumler, 2019). When people in an over-load 
condition, they don’t have enough capacity to deal with the complex situation.  
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When a ship is navigating in the CJK Fairway, due to the complicated hydrological 
and navigable environment, the seafarers must always pay attention to ensure the safe 
navigation of the ship. At this time, the workload of the seafarers is already at a 
relatively high level or even overload. If ship failure happens at this time, it is difficult 
for the seafarers to have extra cognitive resources to deal with emergencies, and the 
crew will in an overloaded working state. According to the above analysis, the 
performance of the crew will rapidly decrease and human errors will increase. 
Among the ship failure events in CJK Fairway, a large portion of them were related to 
human factors. Such as in the Case 1 mentioned in 2.5, the break of the connection 
ring of hydraulic oil pump was because the engineer didn’t maintain the steering 
system as schedule. In Case 2, the direct cause of the failure is mis-operation by the 
chief engineer.  
 
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS BASED ON THE FTA METHOD 
4.1 The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) theory 
4.1.1 Overview of FTA theory 
Since the early 1960s, after the application of FTA and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) in 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of 
Defense of America, FTA technology has experienced a development process from 
simple to complex, from static to dynamic, from traditional to fuzzy. In 1974, a 
scientific research team led by Rasmussen of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology in the United States, using FTA and ETA analysis methods, published the 
famous WASH-1400 risk assessment report on pressurized water reactor accidents, 
which caused great shock in the industry. Based on this, the FTA theory was born (Han, 
2020). In 1977, Lapp and Powers proposed a non-coherent correlated fault tree model 
using computational automatic construction, which opened up a new method of 
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computer automatic construction and once again pushed FTA research to a new high 
level (Shi & Wang, 1993). At present, as a means of evaluating system reliability and 
safety, FTA has been widely used in aerospace, nuclear energy, electric power, 
chemical industry, machinery, transportation, civil engineering and other fields. 
The FTA method is a method of analyzing and diagnosing using logic block diagrams, 
which is widely used in equipment failure safety diagnosis and analysis. With the 
progress of industry, FTA has been improved and strengthened, and formed a complete 
program and theory, which has been developed and used a lot (Cao & Cheng, 1986).  
Before understanding the fault tree theory, we must first understand the nature of the 
fault tree. 
Essentially, the fault tree is a special tree-like logic diagram that graphically shows 
how the system fails (Purba, 2014). The input event of the logic gate is the "cause" and 
the output event is the "effect". Through layer-by-layer analysis of all influencing 
factors that may cause system failures, the logical relationship between equipment 
failures and various influencing factors is revealed. Therefore, the fault tree is similar 
to a system "snapshot" of a specific fault state (Ruijters & Stoelinga, 2015). It can not 
only reveal the various cause of system faults, display the weak links of the system, 
but also calculate the probability of each fault and evaluate each from different 
perspectives and evaluate the importance of each module from different perspectives.  
The FTA method takes an undesired product failure event as the analysis target, and 
find all possible causes one by one from upwards to downwards, so as to calculate the 
logical relationship between various bottom events and top events that may exist in the 
analyzed system such as component failures, environmental influences, and human 
factors, and represented by an inverted tree diagram (Gusmao, Sliva, Poleto, Sliva & 
Costa, 2018). After building the fault tree, qualitatively analyze the combination 
method and combination path of each bottom event's impact on the top event, and 
quantitatively calculate the degree of such impact, and calculate the probability of 
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causing the system failure that needs to be analyzed (Yeh & Simmons 2013). 
4.1.2 Advantages and disadvantages of the FTA method 
Fault tree analysis is often used at various stages such as system design, trial 
production and normal operation, and its characteristics are: simple, fast, convenient, 
image, etc. (Yao, 1989). 
Advantages of FTA are: 
1) Rather than being subject to a general reliability analysis of the analysis object, it is 
possible to analyze all its failure modes. It can not only analyze the effect of certain 
component failures on the analysis object, but also study the factors that cause the 
failure (Liu, 2003).  
2) The graphics of the fault tree can well reflect the internal relationship of the system, 
and at the same time reveal the relationship between the component failure and the 
system failure, and discover the hidden dangers of the system (Guo, Qi & Li, 2018). 
3) The FTA can not only conduct qualitative research on failure events, but also 
quantify the probability of occurrence of failure events, and apply first-hand data to 
safety assessment. 
4) The fault tree analysis method can be programmed with software, which can build 
a more complete system. 
Disadvantages of FTA are: 
1) For larger or more complex system, the establishment of fault tree takes a longer 
time, which increase the difficulty of calculate (Ferdous, Khan, Veitch & Amyotte, 
2009). Due to the large number of failures, it is necessary to establish fault tree by 
personnel with rich technical knowledge and strong analytical capability.  
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2) The FTA has a high requirement for data statistics, and the fault of each system 
needs to be analyzed separately. 
4.1.3 Common terms and symbols of fault trees 
Because the fault tree is presented through a graph, it is necessary to introduce some 
specific logical relationship gate symbols, event symbols, and basic terms to illustrate 
the logical relationship and causality between events and events. The establishment of 
a fault tree requires many symbols. For the research needs of this article, only events 
and their symbols and logic gates and their symbols are introduced.  
The occurrence of conditions or actions is called events, which includes: 
Top event: It is the result event of the joint action of all events. The top event is located 
at the top of the fault tree and is the target of fault analysis. It is always the output 
event of the logic gate in the fault tree in question rather than the input event.  
Intermediate event: It is the resultant event between bottom event and top event. The 
intermediate event is the output event of a certain logic gate, and at the same time the 
input event of other logic gates. 
Bottom event: Located at the bottom of the fault tree, it is the influencing factor event 
that can only cause other events in the analysis method, and can only be used as the 
input event of the logic gate rather than the output event. 
Basic event: The bottom event that does not need to be ascertained.  
The symbols of each tape of event can be indicated as Table 3 shows. 
Table 3 – Symbols of events 
Symbols Events 
 




Bottom event or basic event 
Source: Author 
In fault analysis, logic gates describe logical causality between events. 
AND gate: Indicates that the output event only occurs when all input events occur. 
OR gate: Indicates that an output event occurs when at least one input event occurs. 
The symbols of AND gate and OR gate can be indicated as table 4 shows. 
Table 4 – Symbols of gates 






4.2 Steps of FTA method 
The steps of the FTA method are to:  
1) clarify the analysis scope of the system and top events; 
2) build a fault tree; 
3) simplified fault tree; 
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4) make a qualitative analysis of the fault tree; 
5) make a quantitative analysis of the fault tree (Wang, 2012). 
The specific analysis process is shown in Figure 14 bellow: 
Figure 14 - Analysis process flow of FTA 
Source: Author 
4.2.1 How to build a fault tree 
1) Be familiar with system failures 
Before building the fault tree of the system, it is necessary for the builder to collect 
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and sort out the data and actual running state of the system extensively (Torng & Jiun, 
1997). At the same time, fully familiar with the structure of the system, what functions 
it has, what is the principle of operation, what are the forms of failure, and what are 
the causes of the failure (Yang, 2005). Only by mastering the basic data of the system, 
can the fault tree be established correctly and a reasonable fault analysis can be carried 
out. 
2) Confirm the top event 
How to distinguish which system events are regarded as top events is the core for 
establishing a fault tree. The builder can choose top events reasonably according to 
their different research perspectives and the perspective of solving practical problems.  
When defining the top event, the concept should be clear, so that it is easy to find the 
direct cause of the top event, and use it for qualitative and quantitative analysis. When 
studying the failure of the system, if it is found that there are many unwanted events 
in the system, then multiple top events should be selected according to the principle of 
the system and multiple fault trees should be established for analysis. 
3) Construct a fault tree 
Starting from the top event, find out all possible direct causes of the events at all levels 
step by step, and use the corresponding symbols to indicate the events and their mutual 
logical relationship, until the bottom event is analyzed.  
There are two methods of tree building: artificial tree building and computer aided tree 
building. Manual tree building is manual tree building, which requires a lot of work 
by analysts. Computer aided tree construction is the main method to solve the 
complexity of large system construction with the help of computer. 
4) Fault tree normalization 
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In order to make a unified description and analysis of the fault tree, the constructed 
fault tree must be normalized into a fault tree containing only basic events, resultant 
events, AND gate, OR gate, and NOT gate. 
5) Fault tree simplification 
After establishing the fault tree, analyze the faults at all levels in turn, simplify the 
relationship between the faults, remove the impossible causes, phenomena and logical 
relationships, and then simplify the fault tree (Sun, Wei & Yu, 2002). 
4.2.2 Qualitative analysis of the fault tree 
Qualitative analysis is an important function of fault tree analysis. The main goal of 
qualitative analysis is to find the causes and combinations of causes that may lead to 
undesirable events related to the system by calculating the cut set and the minimum 
cut set. That is to find all the failure modes that lead to the occurrence of the top event, 
so that the diagnostic staff can find potential failures and design weaknesses to 
optimize the design, and propose feasible measures to enhance the safety factor of the 
system. 
1) Cut set and minimum cut set 
Cut set is a collection of several bottom events that cause the top event of the fault tree 
happen. The minimum cut set is the minimum bottom events that cause the top event 
of the fault tree to occur. It represents a failure mode that caused the top event of the 
fault tree happen.  
For example, the sets that can make top events happen are: 
{X1,}, {X2, X3}, {X1, X2 X3}, {X3, X4}, {X1, X4} 
Since {X1} can directly cause the top event to occur, then {X1, X2 X3} and {X1, X4} 
are no longer the minimum set of bottom events that cause the top event happen. 
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Therefore, the minimum cut sets here are:  
{X1,}, {X2, X3}, {X3, X4} 
2) Ways to find the minimum cut set 
The commonly used methods for finding the minimum cut set include the downlink 
method and the uplink method. The downlink method is used in the later calculation 
of this paper. The basic principle of the downlink method is: for each output event, if 
there is an OR gate below it, then each input event under the OR gate is lined up 
separately. If the following is an AND gate, then all input events under the AND gate 
are arranged in the same row.  
The processes of the downlink method are: Starting from the top event, proceeding 
from top to bottom step by step, repeat the above principles for each resultant event 
until all the resultant events are processed, and the resulting set of bottom events in 
each row is a cut set of the fault tree. Finally, according to the definition of the 
minimum cut set, the cut sets of each row are compared in pairs, and those rows that 
are not the minimum cut set are crossed out, and the rest are all the minimum cut sets 
of the fault tree. 
The following is an example to demonstrate the calculation of the minimum cut set: 
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Figure 15 – An example of the fault tree 
Source: Author 
As for the fault tree given in Figure 15, the steps of downlink method can be shown in 
Table 5 bellow: 
Table 5 – Steps of calculate minimum cut set use downlink method 
Steps 





















Step 1: Below the top event T is an OR gate, then each input events E1 and E2 under 
the gate are arranged in a row. 
Step 2: Below Event E1 is the OR gate, then each input events E3 and E4 under the 
36 
 
gate are arranged in a row; Below the event E2 is the AND gate, then the input events 
E5 and E6 under this gate are arranged in the same row.  
Step 3: Below Event E3 is the AND gate, then the input events X1, X2 and X3 under 
this gate are arranged in the same row; Below event E4 is the AND gate, then the input 
events X3 and X4 under this gate are arranged in the same row; Below the event E5 is 
an OR gate, then the input events X4 and X6 under the gate each arranged in a row and 
combined with the event E6 to form X4E6 and X6E6. 
Step 4: Below Event E6 is an OR gate, then input events X5 and X6 under the gate each 
arranged in a row and combined with the event X4 to form X4X5 and X4X6; Combine 
with event X6 to form X5X6 and X6X6.  
So far, all the resulting events of the fault tree have been processed. Each row obtained 
in step 4 is a cut set. 
Step 5: Make a pairwise comparison. Since {X6} is a cut set, so {X4, X6} and {X5, 
X6} are not the minimum cut set and must be crossed out. Finally, all the minimum cut 
sets of the fault tree are: 
{X6}，{X3，X4}，{X4，X5}，{X1，X2，X3} 
4.2.3 Quantitative analysis of the fault tree 
The main purpose of quantitative analysis is to find the probability of the top event 
and other quantitative indicators, such as the structural importance, probability 
importance and relative probability importance of the bottom event when the 
probability of all bottom events is given. 
For the fault tree shown in Figure 15, if all the bottom events are independent of each 




Table 6 - Probability of each bottom event in Figure 15 
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 
0.02 0.02 0.03 0.025 0.025 0.01 
Source: Author 
1) Disjoint Boolean algebra method to find the probability of the occurrence of 
top events 
As for the fault tree in Figure 15, the steps as followings:  
1) According to the minimum cut sets calculated in 4.2.2, the top event can be 
expressed as the simplest Boolean expression of the sum of the bottom events: 
T=X6 +X3X4 + X4X5 + X1X2X3 
2) Convert the above formula into disjoint Boolean sums: 
T= X6 +X3X4X6തതത + X4X5X6തതത 𝑋3തതത+ X1X2X3 X6തതത 𝑋4തതത (𝑋4തതത+ X4 𝑋5തതത) 
= X6 +X3X4X6തതത + X4X5X6തതത X3തതത+ X1X2X3X6തതത X4തതത 
 Xiഥ  represents the opposite event of the bottom event Xi.  
3) Calculate the probabilities at both ends of the disjointed expression in 2) to get the 
probability of the top event happening. 
Q (q1, q2…q6) = P (X6) + P (X3X4 X6തതത )+ P (X4X5 X6തതത 𝑋3തതത) + P (X1X2X3X6തതത 𝑋4തതത) 
            =q6 + q3q4p6 + q4q5p6p3 + q1q2q3p6p4 
Where pi = 1 – qi, which means the probability that the number i bottom event not 
occur. Bringing into the number to calculate, the probability of the top event occurring 
is: 
Q = 0.011354 
2) Structural importance of the basic event 
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𝑥1, …  , 𝑥𝑖−1, 𝑥𝑖+1, … , 𝑥𝑛 − ሺ𝑥1, …  , 𝑥𝑖−1, 0, 𝑥𝑖+1, … , 𝑥𝑛ሻ] 
i = 1, 2, …, n 
Where （。）is the structure function of the fault tree, σ 1ሺ𝑥1,…,𝑥𝑖−1,𝑥𝑖−1,…,𝑥𝑛ሻ  is the 
sum of all possibles where X1, X2, …, Xi-1, Xi+1, …, Xn taking 0 or 1, respectively. 
The importance of the basic event reflects the importance of each base event in the 
fault tree from the point of fault tree structure.  
3) Probability importance of the basic event 
The probability importance of the number i basic event is: 
IP (i) = 
𝜕
𝜕𝑞𝑖
 Q (q1, q2, … ,qn) 
i = 1,2, … , n 
Where Q (q1, q2, … ,qn) is the probability of the top event occurring. The probability 
importance of the number i basic event means the rate of change in the probability of 
the top event due to a small change in the probability of the number i basic event. 
4) Relative probability importance of the basic event 
The relative probability importance of the number i basic event is: 






 Q (q1, q2, … ,qn) 
i = 1,2, … , n 
The relative probability importance of the number i basic event means the rate of 
relative change in the probability of occurrence of the top event due to a small relative 
change in the probability of occurrence of the number i basic event. 
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4.3 Fault tree analysis of ship failures for ships navigating in the CJK Fairway 
According to the summary of the direct causes of the failures of ships in the CJK 
Fairway from 2015 to 2019 in Chapter 3, combined with the analysis of 895 cases to 
find out the deep-level causes of the failures, and establish models through fault tree 
theory to carry out qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. 
A fault tree drawing and analysis software FreeFat developed by Professor Meng 
Xianfei of China University of Mining and Technology is used in this dissertation to 
establishment, qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis of the fault tree. The 
software's qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis follow the classic algorithm 
described in 4.2. Because the fault tree in this article is quite large, the FreeFat software 
can not only ensure the accuracy of the calculation, but also save a lot of calculation 
process.  
4.3.1 Determination of events 
1) Define the top event 
Ship failures in the CJK Fairway from 2015 to 2019 are the most important part of this 
paper. Therefore, ship failures in the CJK Fairway are defined as the top event of the 
fault tree.  
2) Determination of intermediate events 
The intermediate event is located between the bottom event and the top event, which 
is the cause of ship failures. According to the analysis in Chapter 3, select common 
fault types as the research object, and determine the intermediate events leading to the 
top event as: main engine failure, steering gear failure, cooling water system failure, 
black out and human factors. 
3) Determination of basic events 
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Decomposing the cause of the main engine (ME) failure, the ME component failure, 
ME fuel system failure, ME cooling system failure, ME control system failure, and 
ME lubricating oil system failure are obtained. After further decomposing these faults, 
it is concluded that the basic events leading to the ME component failures are: exhaust 
valve fault, supercharger fault; basic evens lead to fuel system failures are: fuel 
injection pipe fracture, fuel injection pump fault, fuel injector block, fuel filter block; 
basic events lead to ME cooling system failures are: ME water pump fault, cylinder 
leakage; basic events lead to ME control system failures are: control circuit board fault, 
control air system fault; basic events lead to ME lubricating system failures are: ME 
lubricating filter blockage, no back up filter, lubricating oil mixed with impurities. 
Decomposing the cause of the steering gear failure, the relevant basic events are: 
steering gear hydraulic oil leakage, steering gear hydraulic pump fault, rudder 
intertwine with rope, hydraulic control valve stuck.  
Decomposing the cause of the cooling system failures, the relevant basic events are: 
seawater inlet filter blocked, cooling pipe damage, large quantities of air enter the 
cooling piping.  
Decomposing the cause of the black out, the relevant basic events are: generator engine 
suddenly shut down, generator engine can’t reset in short time.  
Decomposing the cause of the human factor, the relevant basic events are: mis-
operation, crew not familiar with the system, fatigue.  
4.3.2 Develop the fault tree 
According to the above established events and combined with the logical relationship 
between each event, connect all events by AND gate or OR gate. Using FreeFat 




Figure 16 – Fault tree of ship failures for ships navigating in the CJK Fairway 
Source: Author 
The corresponding event code information in the fault tree is shown in Table 7 bellow: 
Table 7 - Event code information 
Event Code Event Name Event Code Event Name 
T  Ship failures for ships 
navigating in the CJK 
Fairway 
X8 ME cylinder leakage 
M1 ME failure X9 ME control circuit board 
fault 
M2 Steering gear failure X10 ME control air system 
fault 
M3 Cooling system failure X11 ME lubricating filter 
block 
M4 Black out X12 No back up filter 
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M5 Human factor X13 Lubricating oil mixed 
with impurities 
M6 ME component failure X14 Steering gear hydraulic oil 
leakage 
M7 ME fuel system failure X15 Steering gear hydraulic 
pump fault 
M8 ME cooling system 
failure 
X16 Rudder intertwine with 
rope 
M9 ME control system failure X17 Hydraulic control valve 
stuck 
M10 ME lubricating oil system 
failure 
X18 Seawater inlet filter 
blocked 
X1 ME exhaust valve fault X19 Cooling pipe damage 
X2 ME supercharger fault X20 Large quantities of air 
enter the cooling piping 
X3 ME fuel injection 
pipe fracture 
X21 Generator engine 
suddenly shut down 
X4 ME fuel injection pump 
fault 
X22 Generator engine can’t 
reset in short time 
X5 ME fuel injector blockage X23 Mis-operation 
X6 ME fuel filter blockage X24 Crew not familiar with the 
system 
X7 ME water pump fault X25 Fatigue 
Source: Author 
4.3.3 Qualitative analysis of the ship failure fault tree 
Through making qualitative analysis, we can find the influencing factors and the 
combination of influencing factors that lead to the occurrence of top events, and find 
the weak links in the system, so as to provide targeted opinions on improving design 
or management. Qualitative analysis is one of the important roles of fault tree theory. 
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Through using the FreeFat software and using downlink method, 20 minimum cut sets 
of the fault tree can be obtained as below:  
(X1), (X10), (X11*X12*X13), (X14), (X15), (X16), (X17), (X18), (X19), (X2), 
(X20), (X21*X22), (X23*X24*X25), (X3), (X4), (X5), (X6), (X7), (X8), (X9). 
Looking at the above minimum cut sets, it can be found that most of the minimum cut 
sets consist of only one single basic event. This is due to the large number of ship 
systems and the large number of key equipment on board. Although some safety 
redundancy has been made in the design of ships from the perspective of safety, the 
failure of a small part of a system will still cause the whole ship to lose control. This 
partly reflects the vulnerability of ships to safe operation. 
At the same time, it can be found that the minimum cut set that consists of a single 
event is the basic event of the main engine failure, steering gear failure and cooling 
water failure. In other words, in these systems, the occurrence of a single basic event 
can directly lead to the occurrence of a top event.  
4.3.4 Quantitative analysis of the ship failure fault tree 
1) The determination of the probability of each basic event 
The probability of basic event occurrence is the basis of qualitative analysis of fault 
tree. However, for the 25 basic events in this paper's fault tree, it is difficult to 
accurately determine their probability of occurrence. On the one hand, the situation of 
each ship cannot be same, on the other hand, it is impossible to collect such a huge 
amount of data.  
As a solution, the author communicated with experienced experts in the industry, and 
asked them to estimate the probability of each basic event through a questionnaire 
survey, and then weighted the average. In order to make the estimation more accurate, 
the author distributed questionnaires to 10 experts engaged in different fields (see 
44 
 
Annex 1), which are: 1 PSCO from Shanghai MSA, 7 ocean-going ship chief engineers 
from different ships, 1 field surveyor and 1 mechanical supervisor from shipping 
company.  
All the 10 questionnaires were recovered and the data were valid. The weighted 
average of the occurrence probability of each basic event was shown in Table 8. 
Table 8 - Probability of each basic event by questionnaire  
Event Code Probability Event Code Probability 
X1 0.001 X14 0.003 
X2 0.001 X15 0.002 
X3 0.002 X16 0.002 
X4 0.006 X17 0.003 
X5 0.015 X18 0.007 
X6 0.004 X19 0.005 
X7 0.002 X20 0.004 
X8 0.005 X21 0.003 
X9 0.001 X22 0.01 
X10 0.002 X23 0.05 
X11 0.002 X24 0.05 
X12 0.02 X25 0.01 
X13 0.005   
Source: Author  
2) Structure importance analysis 
According to FreeFat's calculation of the logic structure of the fault tree, the structural 






Through the structural importance analysis, it can be found that among the bottom 
events that may lead to the occurrence of the top event, the bottom events involving 
main engine failure, steering gear failure and cooling water system failure have greater 
structural importance. This is consistent with the proportion of fault categories. 
3) Probability importance analysis 
After entering the occurrence probability of each basic event into FreeFat, the 
probability importance of the basic event can be obtained as shown in Table 9. 
Table 9 - Probability importance of each basic event 
Ranking Probability importance Ranking Probability importance 
1 X1(0.93774) 14 X15(0.92553) 
2 X5(0.93774) 15 X16(0.92553) 
3 X18(0.9301) 16 X2(0.924607) 
4 X4(0.92925) 17 X9(0.924607) 
5 X19(0.9283) 18 X21(0.00923) 
6 X8(0.92832) 19 X22(0.00277) 
7 X6(0.92739) 20 X25(0.00230) 
8 X20(0.9273) 21 X23(0.00046) 
9 X14(0.9264) 22 X24(0.00046) 
10 X17(0.926) 23 X11(0.00009) 
11 X3(0.9255) 24 X13(0.00003) 
12 X7(0.9255) 25 X12(0.00002) 
13 X10(0.925)   
Source: Author 
The probability importance analysis results are consistent with the structural 
importance, showing that the basic events of the main engine failure, steering engine 




4) Relative probability importance analysis 
After entering the occurrence probability of each basic event into FreeFat, the relative 
probability importance of each basic event can be obtained as shown in Table 10. 







1 X1(0.18431) 14 X15(0.02425) 
2 X5(0.18431) 15 X16(0.02425) 
3 X18(0.08531) 16 X2(0.01211) 
4 X4(0.07305) 17 X9(0.01211) 
5 X19(0.06082 18 X22(0.00036) 
6 X8(0.06082) 19 X21(0.00036) 
7 X6(0.04860) 20 X23(0.00030) 
8 X20(0.04860) 21 X24(0.00030) 
9 X14(0.03641) 22 X25(0.00030) 
10 X17(0.03641) 23 X12(0.00001) 
11 X3(0.02425) 24 X13(0.00001) 
12 X7(0.02425) 25 X11(0.00001) 
13 X10(0.02425)   
Source: Author 
Through the relative probability importance analysis, it can be found that the 
probability of ship failures can be effectively reduced by reducing the main engine 
failure. 
CHAPTER 5 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CHALLENGES IN THE FUTURE 
5.1 Recommendations 
As the ship equipment work under the conditions of high temperature, humidity, 
vibration, and even bad weather for a long time, they are prone to all kinds of faults. 
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In addition, the complex hydrologic and navigation characteristics of the CJK Fairway 
further increases the possibility of failure. If a ship failure while sailing in the open 
ocean, there will be enough time and space to repair it, but in the CJK Fairway with 
dense ships and narrow waterways, if the ship breaks down and causes operation 
restrictions or even out of control, it will easily lead to grounding, collisions and even 
oil spills.  
According to the above analysis, there are certain rules to follow in the failure of 
vessels in CJK Fairway. First of all, the main engine failure, steering gear failure and 
cooling water system failure are the most common failure types. Secondly, the 
probability of ship failure is higher in the high temperature season. 
According to the investigation and analysis after the accident, a large proportion of the 
failures could have been avoided, either because the ship maintenance was not in place, 
or the crew's emergency response was not timely, leading to a small fault that 
eventually led to the loss of control of the whole ship. Therefore, based on the above 
analysis, the author puts forward corresponding recommendations to vessels, 
management companies and competent authorities in order to reduce the failure rate 
of vessels navigating in the CJK Fairway. 
4.1.1 For ship management companies 
The ship management companies should carry out the main responsibility of ship 
safety management and create a good safety culture atmosphere in the fleet. Firstly, 
the management companies should ensure that there are sufficient resources on board, 
such as personnel, spare parts and food. It is not reasonable to reduce ship manning, 
spare parts inventory, and extend ship maintenance schedule in consideration of 
excessive cost savings. The ship should be docked on time according to the planned 
time frame. Secondly, the management companies should supervise the 
implementation of the Safety Management System (SMS) on board ships. Effective 
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implementation of the SMS should be strengthened by strengthening crew training 
before new crew members on board the ship and enhance port inspection.  
For ships navigating in the CJK Fairway, they should be informed the hydrological 
characteristics, navigation characteristics and local requirements in advance, so that 
the ship could be prepared in advance to ensure the ship in a good condition. Ships 
with excellent safety operating records should be rewarded to increase the motivation 
and sense of honor of the crew.  
4.1.2 For ships navigating in the CJK Fairway 
According to Article 4 of the “CJK Deepwater Channel Navigation Safety 
Management Measures”, revised and implemented by the Shanghai MSA on 
September 1, 2019, “Vessels intending to enter deep water channels shall be tested in 
advance on main engine, steering gear, communications and emergency equipment, 
etc., and ensure that they are in good technical condition” (Shanghai MSA, 2019).  
Vessels shall be inspected in advance in accordance with the prescribed article, 
especially the main engine systems, steering gear and cooling water systems, and any 
faults shall be solved before entering the fairway. Because by the statistics and FTA, 
theses system more likely failure in the CJK Fairway during sailing. In normal 
operation, the crew shall maintain the ship's equipment on time according to the 
maintenance plan to ensure the smooth operation of the SMS.  
If a ship breaks down in the channel, the ship should report to Wusong VTS center in 
time so that VTS can organize emergency response and avoid secondary accidents. 
4.1.3 Supervision measures for the competent maritime authority 
As for Shanghai MSA, the competent authority for navigating vessels in CJK Fairway, 
the author suggests strengthening the management from the following aspects. 
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1) Strengthen supervision of shipping companies 
For shipping companies whose Document of Competence (DOC) certificate are issued 
by Shanghai MSA, the Shanghai MSA can conduct targeted inspections when 
conducting external audits of the shipping companies every year. Before the audit, the 
auditors can check whether the company's ship has failure records in the CJK Fairway 
in the past two years. During the audit they can focus on the company's SMS relate to 
handing procedures of ship failures by looking through relevant records, and verifying 
whether the SMS was implemented. In this way, shipping companies are urged to 
implement their main responsibilities and improve their fleet management level.  
2) Strengthen the on-site inspection of ship failures 
In order to curb the rapid increase in the number of ship failures in the CJK Fairway,  
Shanghai MSA issued a regulation in April 2019 to carry out 100% inspection of 
vessels with electromechanical failures in the fairway and 100% detention of vessels 
with serious deficiencies found in the inspection. In 2019, the detention rate of PSC 
inspection carried out by Shanghai MSA was 8.4%, which was not only the highest in 
all years, but also 2.7 times higher than the average detention rate of 3.13% in Tokyo 
Memorandum (MOU) region (Tokyo MOU annual report, 2019).  
It is suggested that when PSC or FSC inspection is carried out on the failure ships, 
detailed inspection should be carried out around the equipment with fault to confirm 
whether it has returned to normal state. At the same time, confirm the cause of the 
accident, determine whether there is responsibility for ship safety management, 
whether there are human errors, and issue specific deficiencies in the inspection report. 
In addition, the ship’s daily maintenance records, personnel training records, and 
related drill records should be inspected, the overall environment and condition of the 
engine room should be assessed, and the ship’s problems in the management of the 




In the daily PSC or FSC inspection, the maritime authority officers should pay more 
attention on the equipment easy to lead ship failures, such as main engine system, 
steering gear system and cooling water system. If related deficiencies are found by 
PSCOs or FSCOs, the ship should rectify them before departure.  
3) Strengthen the operational inspection of seafarers 
In order to reduce the failures caused by human factors, the competent authority should 
carry out the seafarer’s operational inspections according to the common types of 
failures in CJK Fairway during the inspection. The crew is required to be proficient in 
operating the ship's machinery and equipment within the responsibility to reduce ship 
failures caused by the crew's mis-operation or human error.  
4) Continue to collect data to provide support for innovation in regulatory measures 
In addition, it is necessary to continue collecting and sorting out the information of 
failure ships, requiring the failure ships to provide more abundant and standardized 
information reports, and establishing a database of ships that frequently failures in the 
fairway, so that the competent authority can formulate a more scientific and targeted 
management system.  
5.2 Challenges in the future 
Looking forward to the future, there are many factors affecting the safe operation of 
ships. In view of the impact of new technology and COVID-19, this dissertation 
proposes the possible impact on ship failures. 
5.2.1 New technologies and human error 
Driven by new technologies, more and more new equipment or systems are being used 
on ships. However, these applications are mostly aimed at saving ship operating costs, 
and the systems generated by new technologies are often more complex. Once fault 
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occurs, the service provider often needs to be asked for help because the crew are 
difficult to eliminate the fault.  
A perception of technology as fully reliable and trustful, can lead to underestimating 
risks and consequently to the change of attitude toward seamanship practices and 
procedures (Toni, Nermin & Jelena, 2017), According to Schröder (2012) states, “new 
technology may often create a false sense of confidence, and thereby lead to an 
increase in the acceptance of risks”.  
Therefore, contrary to popular belief, higher levels of automation mean higher safety, 
“technology can contribute to the occurrence of accidents caused by human error and 
hence defeat the purpose for which it was introduced” (Lutzhoft & Dekker, 2002).  The 
ever-increasing functions and high degree of autonomy of automation systems pose 
challenges for monitoring, integrating and interpreting the information provided by 
automation. 
No matter how new technologies in shipping are developed in the future, humans are 
still the ship's controllers, and the competence of the crew is still the decisive factor in 
determining the safety of the ship. If seafarers rely too much on new technology, ship 
failures will not decrease in the future.  
5.2.2 The impact of COVID-19 to ship failures 
Since the outbreak of COVID-19 in early 2020, shipping and crew members have 
suffered a huge impact due to the characteristics of ships' international navigation.  
For ocean-going ships, surveyors and PSCOs are more cautious about contact with 
crew on board. In fact, after the outbreak of the COVID-19, many local governments 
have not allowed surveyors and PSCOs to board ships from abroad. A large number of 
ship survey dates have been postponed for half a year or even longer, and PSC 
inspection volumes in various ports have also dropped significantly.  
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On 12 March, 2020, TOKYO MOU Secretariat issued Circular latter NO. 2020-2 to 
its member states that the Secretariat had permitted ships’ surveys and valid of 
certificates exceeded no more than 3 months due to the impact of COVID-19 (TOKYO 
MOU, 2020). And on 2 June, 2020, the IMO issued Circular latter NO. 4204/Add.19 
that the Administration could extend the period of validity of a certificate for no more 
than 3 months (IMO, 2020). This makes the ship lack important safety barriers like 
survey and PSC, which is not conducive to maintaining a safe state.  
For crew members, many ports have banned them from disembarkation as a precaution 
against COVID-19, leaving them unable to change shifts as planned. According to 
IMO news, as of September 14, more than 300,000 seafarers cannot be repatriated, 
and those on board have had their contracts extended, sometimes beyond 17 months 
(IMO, 2020). Travel restrictions imposed by governments around the world have 
created significant hurdles to crew changes and repatriation of seafarers, which has led 
to a growing humanitarian crisis as well as significant concerns for the safety of 
seafarers and shipping (IMO, 2020). 
A large number of crew members have overdue service on the ship, which is extremely 
unfavorable to the crew's mental state, and is more prone to fatigue and excessive 
mental stress. In this state, human errors will increase significantly, and ship failures 
are more likely to occur. 
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION  
As the CJK Fairway is located at the mouth of the Yangtze River, its hydrological 
characteristics are relatively complex and changeable, which brings certain difficulties 
to ship navigation. In addition, the CJK Fairway is densely navigable throughout the 
year and there are many meeting points for ships. Ships navigating in the CJK Fairway 
needs to frequently change the main engine load and course to keep the ship on a safe 
route. This increases the probability of ship failures in the CJK Fairway. 
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By analyzing the ship failure information collected by Wusong MSA in 2018 and 2019, 
main engine failures accounted for the highest proportion of all failure types. Other 
common failure types include steering gear failure, cooling water system failure, and 
black, etc. Through the fault tree analysis method, it is also found that the main engine 
failure has the greatest probability lead to the ship failure, which is consistent with the 
actual data.  
However, in quantitative analysis, because the probability of occurrence of each basic 
event is difficult to accurately calculate, the author invited experts to estimate, which 
is subjective. 
Ship failures are very harmful to the environment and navigation safety of the Yangtze 
River estuary areas and require the joint efforts of all departments of the entire industry. 
Although the future will face the challenges from new technologies and COVID-19 
epidemic, as long as the ship management companies, ships and competent authority 
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Dear experts, thank you for taking the time to participate in this questionnaire survey. 
Please make an assessment of the probability of the following events occurring while 
the ship is sailing in the CJK Fairway based on your work experience and knowledge. 
Event Code Event Name Probability of failure happen 
X1 ME exhaust valve fault  
X2 ME supercharger fault  
X3 ME fuel injection pipe fracture  
X4 ME fuel injection pump fault  
X5 ME fuel injector blockage  
X6 ME fuel filter blockage  
X7 ME water pump fault  
X8 ME cylinder leakage  
X9 ME control circuit board fault  
X10 ME control air system fault  
X11 ME lubricating filter block  
X12 No back up filter  
59 
 
X13 Lubricating oil mixed with 
impurities 
 
X14 Steering gear hydraulic 
oil leakage 
 
X15 Steering gear hydraulic pump 
fault 
 
X16 Rudder intertwine with rope  
X17 Hydraulic control valve stuck  
X18 Seawater inlet filter blocked  
X19 Cooling pipe damage  
X20 Large quantities of air enter the 
cooling piping 
 
X21 Generator engine suddenly shut 
down 
 
X22 Generator engine can’t reset in 
short time 
 
X23 Mis-operation  
X24 Crew not familiar with the 
system 
 
X25 Fatigue  
Your professional identity is: ___________________________________________ 
Thank you again for taking the time to participate in this survey. Wish you all the best! 
